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INTRODUCTION

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code' is under attack. Critics complain that
the Chapter 11 process takes too long and yields paltry results.' However, this
Article's view is more circumscribed. While Chapter 11 can be used abusively,
nothing inherent in its provisions necessitates abusive results. Indeed, if
properly used, Chapter 11 is a potent vehicle to achieve positive economic
results not otherwise obtainable in our legal system. Such assertions, however,
are essentially empirical. In the abstract, the provisions of Chapter 11 seek to
1. Bankruptcy Code, I I U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2. A typical complaint is found in the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's
Report:
[Tihe great majority of Chapter II debtors lack any
genuine prospect for reorganization, i.e.
fundamentally, business viability [which] is measured
in terms of a consistent generation of cash revenue in
excess of cash disbursed does not exist. Debtors are
not required to make any showing of viability to file
Chapter 11 (and the Commission has not proposed
the imposition of such a requirement). At the same
time, a moribund business generally has little to lose
by seeking relief in bankruptcy. By filing under
Chapter 11, the debtor gets the immediate benefit of
the automatic stay, retains control of the business,
and is under no requirement to pay creditors or file a
plan promptly. Chapter II thus lures many small
business debtors who have no realistic hope of
confirming a plan.
NATIONAL BANKR. REvIEw COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY:

THE NExT TWENTY YEARS 612 (1997)
(available at <http://162.140.225.1/report/09bmass.html> (footnote omitted) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penaltyfor Debtor and
CreditorInterests, 77 CORNELLL. REv. 1088, 1089 (1992) ("Chapter I I is more an intensivecare ward (or a mortuary) than a healing potion for sick businesses.").
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produce feasible reorganizations through confirmed plans. This is
accomplished by incorporating economic tests such as "feasibility" 3 into
Chapter 11 and then relying on bankruptcy judges to determine whether the
economic tests are satisfied.4 Accordingly, many studies of Chapter 11 use the
confirmation standards set forth in § 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code' as the
touchstone of Chapter 11 success. 6 These studies7 often conclude that Chapter
11 is not working both because of low confirmation rates, some of which are
reported to be less than one in seven,' and because of assertions that the time
taken in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings is not worth the meager
results.'
This Article presents empirical data which indicate that, at least for one
region of the country during the period studied, confirmation rates may be
higher than those commonly bantered about. In Region 10 of the United States
Trustee system-comprising all of Indiana and Southern
Illinois-approximately forty percent of all Chapter 11 cases occurring
between 1990 and 1996 resulted in confirmed plans. Moreover, this Article
refutes assertions that it usually takes between two and three, and sometimes
five, years to confirm a plan of reorganization.'° During the seven years studied
in Region 10, the median time debtors spent in Chapter 11 cases resulting in
confirmed plans dropped from approximately fourteen and one-half months to
just over twelve months. Moreover, the overall disposition rate-the median
time all Chapter 11 cases were open-dropped from just under twelve months
to just over eight.
This Article then turns from the descriptive data to potential reasons why
Region 10's results vary from conventional bankruptcy notions. First, debtors
filed Chapter 11 cases in Region 10 at approximately one-half the national rate
during the period studied. Second, although the data were not kept in a manner
to establish firmly the size of each Chapter 11 case, there are grounds to believe
that most of the Chapter 11 cases filed would be classified as "small business"
cases under pending legislation." In addition to differences in the types of cases

3. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(I 1).
4. Id. § 1128(a) (requiring a court hearing on each confirmation).
5. Id. § 1129(a)(I)-(13).
6. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 2, at 611.
7. Seeid. at 610-11 &nn.1549-53.
8. E.g., Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter11 Plans Consummate? The
Results of a Study andAnalysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 318, 325 (1992).
9. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 610, 613 n.1559.
10. Id. at 614.
1I.Current law categorizes a "small business" debtor as one with less than two
million dollars in liquidated and noncontingent debt. Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 101 (51 C)
(1994). The National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed raising this level to five million
dollars. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 618 (recommendation 2.5.1). During the 105th
Congress, legislation ultimately adopted a $4,000,000 level. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794,
at 49 (1998). The House ultimately adopted this Conference report, but it did notpass the Senate.
144 CONG. Rc. H10240 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998).
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filed, this Article discusses other factors particular to Region 10 which may
have influenced that Region's Chapter 11 filings. These factors include: the
existence of an effective Office of the United States Trustee; lower hourly rates
for Region 10 attorneys compared to other parts of the country; and a relatively
small bar which repeatedly appears in Chapter 11 cases, thus facilitating
negotiation of real issues, rather than posturing.
The Article then assesses the effect of these factors when considering what
makes a Chapter 11 filing successful. Rather than simply adopting a legal
definition-a confirmed plan-this Article opts for a more flexible, economic
approach that views Chapter 11 confirmation not as an end in itself, but as one
of the possible and potentially positive results of filing a Chapter 11 case.
This Article concludes with some observations regarding current federal
legislative "reform." In particular, congressional interest in the Chapter 11
filings of small businesses has generated reform proposals which make little or
no sense in light of the Region 10 data. These recommendations would limit
the time to propose and confirm reorganization plans in small business cases
to approximately one-half the time Region 10's data indicate is necessary.
Should these provisions see the light of day, this Article predicts that many
otherwise effective Chapter 11 cases would result in Chapter 7 liquidation to
the detriment of all concerned.
II. CHAPTER 11 DATA FROM REGION 10: 1990-1996

The data presented below consist of 2,393 Chapter 11 cases filed between
1990 and 1996 from Region 10 of the United States Trustee's Office. Region
10 includes Indiana and the Southern and Central Districts of Illinois. 2
A. Sources of the Data
The United States Trustee's Office in Region 10 provided the data used in
this Article. 3 The data are in summary form because not all of the information
kept by the United States Trustee's Office is relevant to this Article or available
to the public. Accordingly, access to the actual database used by the United
States Trustee was not allowed. However, the summary data provided for this
Article are from that database, and responsible individuals within the United
States Trustee's Office have verified that the summaries are accurate.

12. Region 10 excludes the Northern District of Illinois, and thus does not include the
Chicago metropolitan area.
13. Data Summary from the United States Trustee, Region 10 (June 1998) (on file
with South CarolinaLaw Review) [hereinafter Data Summary]. We thank Edward Hopper, the
United States Trustee for Region 10, for permission to use this data. We especially thank Kevin
Dempsey, Assistant United States Trustee for Region 10, for drawing our attention to this data
and for his constant and cheerful responses to our questions regarding its origin and meaning.
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B. Chapter 11 Filings

To obtain an idea of how Chapter 11 filings in Region 10 compare against
filings nationally, this section first examines the national data and trends for
Chapter 11 filings and then examines the data specific to Region 10.
1. Nationwide Chapter11 Filings
During the period from 1990-1996, some 6,511,651 bankruptcy cases were
filed. As shown in Table 1 below, only 126,228 of these filings were Chapter
11 cases (approximately 2% of total filings). 4 In addition, it is noteworthy that
the trend is moving toward fewer Chapter 11 filings, in terms of both absolute
annual numbers and in annual percentages of total filings.' 5
TABLE 1-CHAPTER 11 FILINGS NATIONWIDE
1990
Total
Bankruptcy
Filings

1991

1992

1993

1994

782,960 943,987 971,517 875,202 832,829

1995

1996

Total

926,601 1,178,555 6,511,651

20,783

23,989

22,634

19,174

14,773

12,904

11,911

126,168

Total Chapter 2.65%
11 Filings (%)

2.54%

2.33%

2.19%

1.77%

1.39%

1.02%

1.94%

Total Chapter
11 Filings

2. Region 10 Chapter 11 Filings
Table 2 shows the aggregate bankruptcy filings in Region 10 from 1990 to
1996. Of these 256,329 cases, roughly 84.5%, or 216,696 cases, were Chapter
7 filings, and 14%, or 36,668 cases were Chapter 13 filings. During this period,
only 2,393 Chapter 11 cases, or .93% of the total cases filed, were Chapter 11
cases. Region 10 followed the national trend in that the gross number of
Chapter 11 filings decreased during this period, as did the portion of Chapter
11 cases filed overall. One interesting difference between the national and the
Region 10 figures is that the proportion of Chapter 11 cases in Region 10, as
a percentage of overall filings, is consistently one-half the nationwide Chapter
11 filing rates. Over the seven year period studied, 1.94% of all cases filed
nationally were Chapter 11 cases, while during the same period, only .93% of

14. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FORTHE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY DECEMBER 31, 1996, at 90-91 (Dec. 31, 1996) (statistical information for
1996); Bankruptcy Data (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <ftp://bankrupt.com/Bankrutcy_Statistics>
(statistical information for 1990-1995).
15. Id.
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the cases filed in Region 10 were Chapter 11 cases. This relationship seems
relatively constant on a year-by-year basis.
TABLE 2-BANKRUPTCY FILINGS IN REGION 10,
Region 10
Filings
Total Filings
Ch. 7 Filings
Ch. 7 Filings
(%)
Ch. 13 Filings
Ch. 13 Filings

1990

34,414
30,320
88.10%
3,545
10.30%

1991

1992

1993

1994

1990-96

1995

1996

Totals

34,789
28,435
81.74%

45,157
37,223
82.43%

254,529
215,696

6,062
17.43%

7,664
16.97%

36,734

51

50

47

525

39,475 37,387 32,314 30,993
34,085 32,789 26,989 25,855
86.35% 86.23% 83.52% 83.42%
I
4,848 4,892 4,892 4,831
12.28% 12.48% 15.14% 15.59%

(%)
Combined
Chs. 9& 12
Filings
Combined
Chs. 9 & 12
Filings (%)
Ch. 11 Filings
Ch. 1)IFilings

82

79

0.24%

0.20%

0.29% 0.32%

0.16%

0.14%

0.10%

467
1.36%

463
1.17%

394
1.01%

256
0.83%

242
0.70%

223
0.49%

112

104

329
1.02%

2,374

C. Region 10 Chapter11 DispositionRates
When one turns specifically to Chapter 11 cases in Region 10, the first
issue is the number of cases closed. By "closed," this Article uses the United
States Trustee's definition that a Chapter 11 case is closed when it is either
dismissed, converted to a Chapter 7 case, or has a plan of reorganization
confirmed. 6
1.

Chapter11 Cases Closed

Starting with the total number of cases closed, one may note that these
numbers do not exactly match the number of cases studied (2,393 studied
versus 2,367 cases closed). This discrepancy results because twenty-six cases
from 1996 and before are still open and thus, have not yet made it to the closed
7

category.'

16. See Data Summary, supranote 13. This definition does not track the statute which
states that a Chapter 11 case is closed after all assets are fully administered and the Trustee is
discharged, which is usually long after the plan is confirmed. I1 U.S.C. § 350(a).
17. Specifically, the data indicate that one case filed in 1991 is still open; five cases
from 1994 are still open; four cases from 1995 are still open; and the remaining (16 cases) are
still open from 1996. See Data Summary, supra note 13.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/5
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TABLE 3-CHAPTER 11 CASES CLOSED, REGION

10, 1990-1996

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Totals

455

464

401

348

253

241

205

2367

-4.74%

324

Number
Closed
Percent
Pceant
Change

1.98%

Median

352

Da s 0 en____
Percent
Pcnte
Change

-13.58% -13.22% -27.30%

358

314

342

301

276

-14.94%
246

1.70%

-12.29%

8.92%

-11.99%

-8.31%

-10.87%

2. Chapter11 Cases Confirmed
Of these 2,367 closed Chapter 11 cases, 913 closed because of a confirmed
plan of reorganization. This is a 38.57% aggregate confirmation rate. This rate
is fairly stable, with lows of 30% for 1990 and highs above 41% in 1991 and
1993.
TABLE 4-CHAPTER 11 CASES CONFIRMED, REGION 10, 1990-1996

Number
Nfmed
Confirmed

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Totals

137

191

163

146

102

95

79

913

39.42%

-14.66%

-10.43%

-30.14%

-6.86%

-16.84%

41.16%

40.65%

41.95%

40.32%

39.42%

38.54%

429

421

422

390

362

362

-0.69%

-1.86%

0.24%

-7.58%

-7.18%

0.00%

Percent
Change

Percent

30.11%

ConfirmedIII
Median
dan
432
Days Open
Percent
can
ChangeL

403

3. Chapter11 Cases Converted
Another way a Chapter 11 case can close is by conversion to a Chapter 7
case.'" This may happen in one of two ways. First, the case may not be a
candidate for a successful reorganization, and thus conversion to the liquidation
chapter is accomplished soon after the filing of the Chapter 11 case. Although
some cases merit such a categorization, not all do. Second, in many cases, the
state law liquidation scheme is acceptable to the parties, and thus Chapter 7
provides an appropriate distribution template. However, realization of the

18. I1U.S.C. § 1112.
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maximum value of assets requires those tools found only in a Chapter 11.
These might include not having to replace management, thereby preserving
continuity, as well as the use of possibly expanded powers devolving upon a
debtor in possession in an operating company.
Regardless of how or why it occurred, approximately 30% of all cases in
Region 10 resulted in a conversion to a Chapter 7 during the period studied.
Moreover, the median number of days these cases were pending dropped
during the period studied, with 315 days (ten and one-half months) being the
median for cases commenced in 1990, and 160 days (five months) being the
median in 1996.
TABLE 5-CHAPTER 11 CASES CONVERTED, REGION 10,
1990
Number
Nver
165
Converted
Percent
Pcne
Change
Percent
Conene
36.26%
ConvertedI
Median
da
315
Days Open
Percent
Perce
Change,
_

1990-1996

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Totals

131

119

101

69

66

60

711

-20.61%

-9.16%

-15.13%

-31.68%

-4.35%

-9.09%

29.68%

I 29.02%

27.27%

27.39%

29.27% 30.04%

252

216

237

195

226

160

-20.00%

-14.29%

9.72%

-17.72%

15.90%

-29.20%

28.23%

I

237

4. Chapter 11 Cases Dismissed
Another way in which a Chapter 11 case may close is dismissal. 9 Again,
there are at least two possible stories regarding dismissed cases. One is
negative-the case may involve a two-party dispute which should never have
been in bankruptcy in the first place. A second is less malignant-a case in
which the automatic stay centralizes an ongoing liquidation, with a dismissal
to allow one party (typically a secured creditor) to realize all of the proceeds.
In short, the second scenario presents a two-party dispute in which both parties
want the stabilizing tools available in Chapter 11 when none of the traditional
beneficiaries of a Chapter 11 filing (unsecured creditors) take anything home.
Dismissals occur with a relative frequency similar to that of conversions:
about 32%. As with conversion, the time spent in Chapter 11 before a dismissal
continued on a downward trend during the period studied. While the median
number of days before dismissal in 1990 was 316 (or ten and one-half months),
by 1996 that time had been reduced to 240 days (or eight months).

19. Id.
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TABLE 6-CHAPTER 11 CASES DISMISSED, REGION 10,

Number
Dismissed
Percent
Pcn

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Totals

153

142

119

101

82

80

66

743

-7.19%

-16.20%

-15.13%

-18.81%

-2.44%

-17.50%

33.63%

30.60%

29.68%

29.02%
IIIII

32.41%

33.20%

32.20%

31.39%

316

280

227

249

226

184

186

240

-11.39%

-18.93%

9.69%

-9.24%

-18.58%

1.09%

Change

Percent
Dimed
DismissedI
Median
dan
Days Op~en
Percent
cnt
ChangeI

1990-1996

III. WHY So HIGH?:

THE DATA AND LEGAL CULTURE IN REGION 10

To appreciate the novelty of these figures, one must first consider the
reported data from other studies of Chapter 11. With the exception of one
district in North Carolina in which one particular judge has instituted effective
case management for all of his Chapter 11 cases, 20 most studies show dreary
results for Chapter 11 filings. A recent study shows that 26% of all Chapter 11
cases are confirmed, 2' but other studies have shown that confirmation rates
anywhere from 17% to 27% are not uncommon.2 The question following
from that observation is simple: Why is the confirmation rate in Region 10
more than twice that of other regions, and more than 50% over a similar
nationwide study? We offer some thoughts, none of which are confirmed with
observational data, but which provide a potential framework for further
analysis and empirical study.
The authors begin with the notion that the smaller cases and the close-knit
nature of the bankruptcy community in Region 10-from the attorneys, to the
administrators, and ending with the judges-probably all lead to circumstances
in which Chapter 11 can properly work. Specifically, the authors believe that
Chapter 11 should provide a legal vehicle to solve economic problems. Some
of these problems are psychological; that is, sometimes clients need to file
Chapter 11 and realize that it will not bring about the automatic revival of the

20. Judge A. Thomas Small of the Eastern District of North Carolina reports a 62.9%
Chapter II plan confirmation rate. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 610 n.1549.
21. Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: US. Trustee
DatabaseSheds New Light on Old Questions, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 (1998) (reporting on
131,089 Chapter 11 cases from 1989 to 1995).
22. Jensen-Conklin, supra note 8, at 318 (citing EDWARD M. FLYNN, ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS-STATISTICALANALYSIS&REPORTs DIVISION (SARD), BANKRUPTCY
DIVISION STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 11, at 10 (1989)).

23. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control--Systems Failure Under
Chapter ]] of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 107 (1983).
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company before they will accept the reality that the business is a failure.
However, current legislative reform seems to proceed on the notion that small
cases are "cookie-cutter" cases and that less time is necessary to resolve their
problems.24 Indeed, the reverse may be true; the process of disassociating an
owner of an ultimately viable small business from his or her dream, and
accepting economic reality, may take more time than determining whether the
business is viable in the first instance.
A. Different and Simpler Cases
One potential explanation for the difference in confirmation rates may well
be that the cases in Region 10 are qualitatively different from the norm. The
United States Trustee's Office has provided data for 1997, the year following
the six year survey period of this Article." During 1997, of the 182 Chapter 11
cases filed, only thirteen had liquidated debts in excess of five million dollars.
Of those thirteen, seven were single asset debtors. 6 Thus, only six (or 3.3%)
of the Chapter 11 cases filed were not "small business" cases.
Although hazardous to estimate, it is likely that the cases in the period of
study reflect this ratio. The types of Chapter 11 cases in the Midwest are not
"mega" cases; rather, they involve smaller businesses that, if anything, are
candidates for merger or acquisition by larger companies based elsewhere.
Indeed, the Bankruptcy Review Commission's statistics indicate that
approximately 85% of all Chapter 11 cases fit within its revised "small
business" definition.2 8
Thus, the cases in Region 10 are not qualitatively different from
nationwide Chapter 11 cases-most are "small business" cases. As a result, it
would appear that the type of cases filed in Region 10 do not have much
bearing on the high confirmation rate.
B. Better Administration by United States Trustee
Another possible explanation, especially for the reduction in median days
in Chapter 11 for all classes of disposition, is improved administration by the

24. See COMMISSIONREPORT, supra note 2, at 637 (justifying standardized forms on
the basis of cost savings, not need); id. at 644-45 (justifying shortened time on the basis of
reduction of direct and indirect costs of Chapter 11).
25. Memorandum from Kevin P. Dempsey, Assistant United States Trustee, Region
10, to Bruce Markell (Feb. 5, 1998) (on file with the South CarolinaLaw Review).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 632. See also Elizabeth Warren & Jay L.
Westbrook, The Business Bankruptcy Project: The Work in Progress,72ND ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES 2-20 (1998) (finding in a 17-district
survey that "almost 80% of the Chapter 11 cases would be classified as small business cases
under the Commission recommendation").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss2/5
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Office of the United States Trustee. There is much to be said for this; the
United States Trustee's Office has the statutory power to move, convert, or
dismiss cases, and often uses that power to spur the parties towards settlement

of differences.
C. CheaperAdministration Through Lower Attorneys 'Fees
Another area of potential explanation lies in the administration costs.
Attorneys' fees in a Chapter 11 case are administrative expenses,29 and, like all

administrative expenses, must be paid in full upon confirmation of a plan."
This priority has lead some to hint that lawyers run cases until no assets remain
to pay fees.31 A logical extension of this might be that the lower the hourly rates
lawyers charge, given the same size business, the longer the Chapter 11 would
take. In Region 10, as in other areas of the country, hourly rates are generally
lower than in New York or other metropolitan areas. 32 However, rather than
showing longer times in Chapter 11, the data indicate increasingly shorter
times.33 Perhaps the lower costs of attorneys allows the parties to explore more
options at lower costs; perhaps the lower cost is irrelevant. We leave this point
to other empirical studies.

29. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1994).
30. Id. § 1129(a)(9). Of course, the plan proponent and the attorneys may agree to a
different payment or a payment over time. Id.
31. This view is consistent with the hint, threaded through the Commission's Report,
that professionals "milk" Chapter I I cases for fees and then turn the remaining scraps over to
creditors. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 609. The Commission quoted the position paper
of Philip J. Hendel:
Most small business Chapter 11 cases fail. They do,
however, take a while to filter through the system.
There are usually substantial administrative fees and
expenses that have been paid to the professionals.
When the well runs dry, the cases therefore die from
dehydration. When they are finally converted to
Chapter 7 there is rarely a dividend to unsecured
creditors.
Id. at 613 n.1559; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter11, 1993 Wis. L. REv.
729, 729 ("During that time, the business is at risk because management incentives are
inappropriate, professional fees accrue at a rapid rate, and business uncertainties increase.").
32. In re Palm Beach Cruises, S.A., 208 B.R. 78, 81-82 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997) in
which the bankruptcy court reduced the hourly rates of Rogers & Wells from a range of $245
to $420 per hour to the southern Florida standard of $200 to $300 per hour. By way of reference
to Region 10, one author (Markell) was formerly a partner with the national law firm of Sidley
& Austin. When he left Sidley in 1990, his billing rate as a third year partner was $250 per hour.
However, upon association with Ancel & Dunlap in 1997, the determination was made that the
market price for his services would be $200 per hour.
33. See supra Table 3.
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D. More Responsive Local Legal Culture
Another possible explanation is the nature and quality of the professionals
who assist in the Chapter 11 process. If the culture of those professionals is
consistent with goals that lead to confirmation and conciliation, then one would
expect higher confirmation rates. If, on the other hand, the legal culture is
fixated on vindication of individual rights at the expense of collective solutions,
then a lower confirmation rate may follow.
Several factors lead one to believe that Region 10's professionals may be
qualitatively different than professionals in other regions. First, the data suggest
that reorganization lawyers in Region 10 are better at screening. The filing rate,
which is one-half the national average, is evidence that only likely
reorganization candidates enter bankruptcy court.34 Additionally, several other
intangible factors may contribute to better screening decisions, and better
decisions once a Chapter 11 case is filed. First, Region 10 has a relatively small
bar with few bankruptcy professionals.35 Second, in a smaller bar, the actions
taken by its members receive enhanced scrutiny by the remainder of the
members. Therefore, a lawyer who engages in a "scorched earth" strategy may
well rue that decision in later cases when other lawyers justifiably react to
expectation of a repeat performance. Finally, the ethic of education and the
training given is strong in Region 10.36
IV. CHAPTER 11 "SUCCESS" AND ITS MEASUREMENT

Much has been written about what constitutes a successful Chapter 11
case.37 Of course, as with all such questions, the term "success" must be
defined before answering. Obviously, if the goal is confirmation pursuant to
§1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, the answer will be different than if the goal is
avoidance of the waste inherent in liquidating going concerns. Indeed, unless
one makes the unwarranted assumption that compliance with the statute is
coextensive with success, one must first look at what can and does happen not
only in Chapter 11 cases, but also in the termination or reduction of businesses
generally.

34. The authors express no view on whether this is because creditors' lawyers are
better at dissuading counsel to hopeless debtors not to file, or whether debtors' lawyers are better
at evaluating which cases will result in successful Chapter I I reorganizations.
35. For example, the annual advanced Chapter 11 seminar for Indiana, the Sig Beck
Bankruptcy Roundtable, is limited to 40 persons, and that seems to be the correct number.
36. This is due in no small part to the efforts of Douglass Boshkoff, who has taught
bankruptcy at the highest standards at Indiana University for over 25 years.
37. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 23, at 106-14.
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What Can Happen in Chapter 11 and Elsewhere

When a business fails, many things can happen. The failure can be ignored
and the participants, debtors and creditors, may simply choose to carry on as
if nothing is wrong. This activity is not uncommon and may go on as long as
the debtor has capital to waste, or as long as creditors continue to extend
unsecured credit. However, at some point the failure cannot be ignored. At that
time, questions concerning the continued existence of the business have to be
addressed. Quite often these questions are addressed not in the context of
saving a failed business, but in the context of obtaining more capital to continue
operations. A closely intertwined question will be: What was the cause of the
failure? If the failure is due to a one-time problem, such as an uninsured loss,
the response will be different than if the failure was caused by a pervasive
problem, such as a lack of demand for the company's products or services.
The need to address business failure may occur at different times for
different participants. The stereotype is that a business's problems first become
apparent to its creditors, whose notice comes in the form of unpaid bills.
Indeed, it is often the realignment of the business owner's expectations with
reality that takes time. But creditor expectations are also often in need of
realignment. Very few, if any, businesses, not even banks, operate on the
premise that they can pay, in cash, all of their debts at once. Thus, in business
reorganizations the expectations of all parties have to conform to reality before
a sensible plan to address the business failure can occur.
The ways in which sensible participants can reorganize a business is
limited only by their imagination. However, in reality our system is skewed
towards liquidation as evidenced by the default resolution of business failure
being liquidation." This baseline resolution obviously affects the ways in
which creditors approach a debtor. Moreover, this approach emphasizes that
creditors often do not want to manage, or are not competent to manage, their
debtor's business. In short, the costs of learning the business sufficient to create
a feasible reorganization, discounted by the fact that feasible reorganization
may not be possible, often outweigh the loss of any reorganization value
through liquidation.
Thus, the individual interests of the creditors in immediate payment often
swamp the debtor, who may not yet have realized that it needs to address a
deep-rooted, economic problem. As a consequence, many Chapter 11 cases
begin as exercises in revising long-held assumptions and premises about the
business and investigations into the true economic position of the company;
however, these types of investigations take time. Had the business owners been
more savvy, or had their optimism not clouded their business judgment, these
types of investigations would have occurred before the failure of the business.

38. We use "liquidation" to mean the piecemeal sale and realization of the business's
assets without regard for any synergy the assets may have when used in combination with each
other. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 931 (6th ed. 1990).
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But they did not. Thus, rather than starting a case with a known problem and
a few plausible solutions, Chapter 11 cases generally start with confusion
compounded by pride. Time is necessary to sort out whether the business can
be kept together.
B. What Happens in Chapter11
The commencement of a Chapter 11 case immediately saddles a business
with new reporting requirements"9 and new duties to creditors.40 Although the
automatic stay helps keep the business intact, it does not help address the core
issue: is the debtor economically viable, and what is the best capital structure
to maximize its value to all? In theory, these decisions are made in concert with
a creditors' committee appointed by the Office of the United States Trustee. In
practice, most cases do not have effective creditor input through a creditors'
committee; statistics indicate that almost 85% of all Chapter 11 cases do not
have a creditors' committee. 4 In this void, it falls to the debtor or to the debtorin-possession's counsel, to run the reorganization, with the oversight of the
Office of the United States Trustee. In such circumstances, it is heartening,
rather than distressing, that slightly more than a quarter of all Chapter 11 cases
result in a confirmation.42 Without effective creditor input as to preferences, it
is a wonder that consensual plans can be achieved. The lack of creditor
involvement also supports the notion that attorneys in Region 10 may be better
at reorganization than others, or at least better at gauging creditor reactions to
proposed plans.
Unfortunately, not all cases can be saved. The combination of incentives
and disincentives for business managers prior to filing for bankruptcy often
results in Chapter 11 cases being filed too late to obtain any effective relief. In
short, although both owners and creditors may not realize it, no economically
viable business remains by the time the case is filed. Once this realization
occurs, the question arises as to whether Chapter 11 is at all appropriate. The
practical answer is that it is appropriate, and creditors and other participants use
the process to maximize their returns in several ways. Most often, even though
the debtor may not be able to use the assets beneficially, someone else can.
That person is identified, and wants to buy all or some of the assets. Is this
better done in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11? From a legal standpoint, the basic rules
are the same: section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits sales free

39.

IRVING SULMEYER ETAL., 1998 COLLIERHANDBOOKFOR TRUSTEES ANDDEBTORS

INPOSSESSION 19-364 to -365 (Lawrence P. King ed. 1998).

40. For discussions ofdebtor duties to creditors, see, for example, Thomas G. Kech,
The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1323
(1992); Jeffrey C. Krause, Whose Lawyer Are You: Fiduciary Obligations of Debtor and
Debtor-in-Possessionand Counsel, BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J., Winter/Spring 1997, at 37.
41. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 642.
42. See infra Part.II.
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and clear of encumbrances,43 is available in either chapter.
While the ultimate resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, an initial observation would be that Chapter 11 has some benefits over
Chapter 7. Because existing (and cooperative) management knows the business
better than a newly-appointed trustee, it can provide information necessary to
satisfy the bidder in a more expeditious fashion. In many smaller businesses,
the owners may be lousy managers, but may still have something to contribute
to an ongoing business. In Chapter 11 the new owners can structure the sale to
maximize the value of the past owner's knowledge. Furthermore, a business
may file Chapter 11 to stabilize one particular situation, and after that problem
is resolved, no need for reorganization remains. Because there is no insolvency
requirement for filing," once the isolated problem is resolved the business may
be solvent and feasible. In such a case, dismissal is appropriate.
These possible outcomes are not exclusive. Many Chapter 11 cases are
filed too late, and Chapter 11 cannot provide help. Given the diversity of these
types of cases, the key is to sort quickly the good from the bad and the needy
from the greedy and to allow only those cases where Chapter 11 can help to
proceed.
C. Success and CreditorRecovery
The consequences outlined above hint at a definition of success in Chapter
11 that is broader than simply confinning a Chapter 11 plan. So long as the
system imposes duties on estate representatives and on bankruptcy
professionals to maximize value, Chapter 11 will be used in ways beyond
simply plan confirmation. Arguably, sales of assets followed by conversion to
Chapter 7 or dispute resolutions followed by dismissal benefit creditors. In fact,
creditors stand abetter chance of ultimate payment if the debtor's problems are
addressed and resolved rather than ignored and the debtor dismantled.
Therefore, the authors believe a rough definition of a successful Chapter
11 is one in which all participants receive more than they would have if
liquidation had been initiated. Thus, successful Chapter 11 reorganizations
include those in which a sale of assets is followed by a Chapter 7 filing.
Unfortunately, the database used for this Article does not indicate how many
cases fit into this category; that study must be left for the future. However, the
authors think it is implausible that a narrow, legal definition of success can
stand given the myriad of consequences following a business failure and the
creativity and imagination used by lawyers and their clients in addressing those
consequences under the current system.

43. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (1994).
44. Id. § 109.
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V. TREATING SYMPTOMS AND NOT CAUSES: THE DATA AND CURRENT
REFORM PROPOSALS

Bankruptcy reform is currently a hot topic. The rise in bankruptcy filings,
especially by consumers, has caused something approaching a furor in
Congress. Although Chapter 11 filings are actually declining, many of these
proposals want to "fix" Chapter 11. To paraphrase from Mammy Yokum, Al
Capp's cartoon creation, the authors believe that "ifit ain't broke, don't fix it."
The Article now examines some of these proposals in light of the data from
Region 10 and earlier observations on Chapter 11.
A.

The Commission'sProposal

On October 20, 1997, the Bankruptcy Review Commission submitted its

report.4" The report includes chapters devoted to reform of Chapter 11 as it

applies to small businesses. 6 The authors believe, and the data weakly indicate,
that most of the cases in Region 10 would fit the small business definition,
making these proposals of great interest. However, after analysis these
proposals appear to rest on false assumptions and would reduce the efficacy of
Chapter 11 rather than promote it.
1. The Detailsof the Proposal
The Bankruptcy Review Commission sought to streamline Chapter 11 for
small businesses. It recommended the promulgation and use of standard forms
of disclosure statements.47 Under the Commission's recommendation, debtors
would be required to disclose more standard information, including information
on their profitability, cash flows, and cash disbursements. 48 These disclosures
would be made to the Office of the United States Trustee, because the
Commission believed that, in the absence of creditor involvement, the United
States Trustee was the only watchdog in the system capable of effectively
monitoring debtors. 49 Debtors-in-possession would be required to submit their
most recent balance sheets and their tax returns with their petitions, thus,
making these documents matters of public record."0 The Commission's
recommendations also include enhanced duties to cooperate with the Office of
the United States Trustee. 5'
Finally, the recommendations contain requirements that a debtor file aplan

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 2.
Id. at 609-60.
Id. at 618-19 (recommendation 2.5.2).
Id. at 619-20 (recommendation 2.5.3).
See id. at 639-40.
Id. at 620-21 (recommendation 2.5.4).
Id.
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of reorganization within ninety days, and that it be confirmed within 150
days. 2 These deadlines could be extended only if the debtor-in-possession
shows that a plan of reorganization is more likely than not to be confirmed
within a reasonable time, and if a new deadline is then set. 3
2. Analysis of the Proposal
Proposals such as the Commission's address real concerns, but their scope
ignores many realities. As indicated above, the median time to confirmation in
Region 10 has averaged approximately 403 days over the last six years.5 4 The
last year for which data are available shows a reduction in that number to 362
days.55 It appears that confirmable plans need time to be put together. If that is
the case, then the Commission's proposals fail to achieve their own standard
of Chapter 11 success: plan confirmation.
These data are even more striking when assessed against the median time6
to convert or dismiss cases during this period, 237 and 240 days respectively.
Indeed, during the seven years of this study, these numbers steadily declined,
with the 1996 data showing a median time in Chapter 11 of 160 days
(approximately five months) for cases that were ultimately converted, and 186
days (approximately six months) for cases that were dismissed.57 These figures
indicate that the system works; cases for which early exit is appropriate are
being shown the door early in the bankruptcy process while cases that need the
palliative of Chapter 11 are staying in and getting reorganized.
Based on the above, the shortened time frames portend potential disaster.
When coupled with increased and voluminous reporting requirements, one has
to wonder how many small businesses will survive. A typical Chapter 11
debtor does not have good internal reporting requirements; this is often one
reason why they need to file Chapter 11. To impose reporting as a condition for
confirmation would seem to handicap debtors far beyond the level required to
funnel standardized information to the United States Trustee.
B. Current CongressionalResponses
The 105th Congress nearly passed bankruptcy reform of a truly massive

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 621 (recommendation 2.5.5).
Id. at 621-22 (recommendation 2.5.6).
See supra Table 4.
Id.
See supra Table 5 and Table 6.
Id.
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nature. Both the Senate 58 and the House 9 overwhelmingly passed bankruptcy
reform bills. These bills in turn were sent to conference," and while the House
passed the bill that emerged from conference by a large margin, 6' there was
insufficient time to push the measure through the Senate.
The conference bill followed the House Bill and basically adopted the
Bankruptcy Review Commission's small business proposals, 62 although the
conference bill lowered the debt limit from $5,000,000 to $4,000,000.63 Thus,
the reform proposals are still very much alive, and the imposition of the
Commission's suggested increased reporting requirements and quick time
limits seem likely to be a part of any bankruptcy reform to be considered in the
106th Congress.
C. The DisconnectionBetween the Region 10 Experience and Reform
Proposals
Although addressing the concerns of small business is admirable, the
experience in Region 10 points to a conclusion different from the one
approached by both the Commission and the House. First, the authors assert
that Chapter 11 cases work in Region 10 as evidenced by a high average
confirmation rate, combined with relatively short periods of time spent weeding
out candidates for conversion or dismissal. If that premise is accepted, then it
would appear that the better approach would be to expand, rather than to
contract, the time necessary to reorganize. Any efforts made to improve the
system should be directed towards improving techniques for winnowing the
good from the bad.
However, additional laws may not be necessary to accomplish this goal.
The United States Trustee's Office in Region 10 has shown that it has the
ability to monitor effectively under existing laws. Perhaps a study of their
methods might be more appropriate. Moreover, reform proposals fail to address
the legal culture in which Chapter 11 cases exist. Lawyers in Region 10 file
fewer Chapter 11 cases than their counterparts nationwide. More empirical
evidence is necessary to determine whether this reduced filing results from the
cases they have or from the training they have received and the culture in
which they work. A good case can be made that the lawyers make these cases
work better. Perhaps if the filing rate for Chapter 11 cases in Region 10 were

58. Senate Bill 1301 passed by a 97-1 vote in the Senate on September 23, 1998, in
the nature of a substitute for H.R. 3150, which had been passed earlier in the year by the House.
144 CONG. REc. S10767 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998).
59. House Bill 3150 passed the House on June 10, 1998, by a 306-118 vote. 144
CONG. RFc. H4442 (daily ed. June 10, 1998).
60. H.R. CONF. REP.No. 105-794 (1998).

61. The House passed the conference bill on October 9, 1998, by a vote of 300-125.
See 144 CONG. REc. H10239-40 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998).
62. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794, at tit. IV (1998).
63. Id. § 402.
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the same as for other parts of the country, the confirmation rate would also

drop. There is some better form of "triage" occurring in Region 10; that
increased effort, along with effective monitoring by the Office of the United

States Trustee, results in an increased number of successful Chapter 11
reorganizations. Chapter 11 is not "broke," at least in Region 10, and any
reform that places arbitrary time limits on Chapter 11 debtors will upset the
balance that exists in Region 10, to the detriment of both debtors and creditors.

In short, until one can establish why Chapter 11 works in Region 10, it
makes little sense to impose upon it (and other regions where similar results
might be obtained) solutions for problems not present there. The type of
judicial interventions and case management techniques relied upon by the
reform proposals already exist in § 105(d) of the Bankruptcy Code," and by
making these provisions mandatory, judges are being saddled with procedures

64. Section 105(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(d) The court, on its own motion or on the request of a party in interest,
may(1) hold a status conference regarding any case or proceeding
under this title after notice to the parties in interest; and
(2) unless inconsistent with another provision of this title or
with applicable Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
issue an order at any such conference prescribing such
limitations and conditions as the court deems appropriate
to ensure that the case is handled expeditiously and
economically, including an order that(A) sets the date by which the trustee must assume
or reject an executory contract or unexpired
lease; or
(B) in a case under Chapter 11 of this title(i) sets a date by which the debtor, or
trustee if one has been appointed,
shall file a disclosure statement and
plan;
(ii) sets a date by which the debtor, or
trustee if one has been appointed,
shall solicit acceptances of a plan;
(iii) sets the date by which a party in
interest other than a debtor may file a
plan;
(iv) sets a date by which a proponent of a
plan, other than the debtor, shall
solicit acceptances of such plan;
(v) fixes the scope and format of the
notice to be provided regarding the
hearing on approval of the disclosure
statement; or
(vi) provides that the hearing on approval
of the disclosure statement may be
combined with the hearing on
confirmation of the plan.
Bankruptcy Code, I I U.S.C. § 105(d) (1994).
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that do not match their judicial styles.
The end result of any "reform" is likely to be an increased ineffectiveness
of Chapter 11 for small businesses. However, rather than blaming the reform
for these problems, reformers will inevitably blame Chapter 11 (or the
professionals who make it work).
VI. CONCLUSION

Chapter 11 works in Region 10. Confirnmation rates in this region have
averaged just under forty percent for each of the seven years from 1990 to
1996.65 Furthermore, Region 10 achieves this high rate with decreasing time
spent in Chapter 11, both for cases that confirm 6 and for cases that leave the
system by dismissal67 or conversion. 68 This high rate has not been achieved
with any special laws or any special system ofjudicial management. Although
further study would be needed to state any conclusions with confidence, it
appears that the legal culture and the diligent efforts of the Office of the United
States Trustee, under existing laws, make the difference.
The effect of professionals on the system is evident in the filing rate for
Chapter 11. In Region 10, Chapter 11 cases account for just under one percent
70
of all bankruptcy filings;69 nationwide, the filing rate is about two percent.
Screening by bankruptcy professionals occurs before cases are filed. However,
once in the system, relatively quick exits exist for cases not leading to
confirmation. In 1996, for example, the median number of days72 a converted
cases was open was 160;71 for dismissed cases, it was 186 days.
On the other hand, confirmed cases appear to take longer to resolve. In
1996, the median number of days that a case resulting in plan confirmation was
open was 362. 73 Under current proposals suggested by the Bankruptcy Review
Commission and introduced in Congress, many of these cases would be
weeded out for taking too long. That would be a mistake. Before Congress
reforms Chapter 11, it would be wise to find out why locations such as Region
10 produce better results, rather than imposing upon them solutions devised for
problems experienced elsewhere.
We close with this thought. There is indeed hope in the heartland. Chapter
11 is not broke in Region 10. Accordingly, the authors urge that Congress and
good-hearted reformers to take note of Mammy Yokum's bromide: "If it ain't
broke, don't fix it."

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Supra Table 4.
See id.
See supra Table 6.
See supra Table 5.
Supra Table 2.
Supra Table 1.
Supra Table 5.
Supra Table 6.
Supra Table 4.
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